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Abstract
What is the relationship between state capacity, national identity, and economic development?
This paper argues that increases in state capacity can lower the collective action costs associated
with political and economic exchange by encouraging the formation of a common identity. This
hypothesis is tested by exploiting the fact that the French Monarchy was more successful in
substituting its fiscal and legal institutions for those of the medieval seigneurial regime within
an area of the country known as the Cinq Grosses Fermes (CGF). Highly disaggregated data on
regional self-identification from the 1789 Cahiers de Doléances confirm that regions just inside the
CGF were more likely than regions just outside the CGF to identify themselves with national,
as opposed to local, institutions. We also show that regions inside the CGF that affiliated with
national identity were more economically developed during the first half of the nineteenth century
and more likely to contribute towards local public goods.
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It is only government by a single man that in the long run irons out
diversities and makes each member of a nation indiﬀerent to his
neighbor’s lot.
Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, Book
II, ch. 8
1 Introduction: Capacity, Constraint, and Cooperation
The relationship between political development and economic development is one of the most active areas
of research in social science today. There are two main approaches to this question. One focuses on state
capacity – the ability of government to extract revenue (fiscal capacity) and enforce rules (legal capacity).1
The other approach focuses on the establishment of rule of law, which is commonly associated with credible
constraints on government and the uniform application of rules across all segments of society.2 At the risk
of over-simplifying, the proponents of state capacity claim that any rules consistently enforced on a subject
population (excluding the government itself), are conducive to growth. The rule of law approach, on the
other hand, argues that ‘good’ rules in the sense that they are inclusive (Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)) and
lead to credibly enforced contracts between any group in society are what matters most.
This paper provides evidence that increases in state capacity can facilitate economic development through the
creation of shared norms that facilitate the development of growth-enhancing formal and informal institutions.
We will show that regions with higher state capacity at the end of the eighteenth century in France – before
the constitutional reforms of the Revolution were introduced – were more likely to identify with national, or
general, interests as opposed to local, or particularistic, interests. We will also show that in these same areas
economic development was higher during the first half of the nineteenth century. Finally, we will provide
evidence that within high state capacity regions this economic development was preceded by the formation
of shared norms in favor of the establishment of uniform institutions such as common weights and measures
and laws applied uniformly to all groups.
Following the work of Besley and Persson (2011), economists tend to treat state capacity and rule of law
as being simultaneously determined. This is consistent with observations of present day countries in which
rule of law and state capacity invariably ‘cluster’ together. It is very difficult to identify a country with
strong rule of law, but no ability to collect taxes or enforce legal codes. Our argument, however, suggests
that it is important to unbundle the concepts of state capacity and rule of law since there is evidence that
state capacity may lay the ground-work for the formal establishment of rule of law through generating shared
1The literature is vast. See Weber (1968); Tilly (1990); Besley and Persson (2011); Dincecco (2009); Johnson and Koyama
(2013, 2014b,a) and the citations therein.
2This literature is also vast. See North and Weingast (1989); Rodrik et al. (2004); Acemoglu et al. (2005) and the citations
therein.
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norms of cooperation.
The fundamental identification problem this paper addresses is that there may be unobservable variables
correlated with both state capacity and national identity. For example, linguistic fractionalization or economic
development. To minimize these potential sources of bias, two rich historical episodes will be exploited. The
first is the creation of the internal free trade zone known as the Cinq Grosses Fermes (CGF) in 1664 by Louis
XIV’s finance minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert. Within the area of the CGF, the absolute monarchy achieved
more success in suppressing the local privileges that were inherited from the feudal regime than it did outside
the CGF boundaries (Heckscher, 1955, 103-106). More importantly, the monarchy was much more successful
in imposing its centralized fiscal institutions on the populations within the CGF. This forced individuals
within the CGF to interact with, and eventually identify with, a centralized French state. Instead of (or in
addition to) paying local landlords taxes and dealing with seigneurial justice, merchants, nobles, and clergy
within the CGF were increasingly subjected to royal, or ‘French’, tax bureaucracies and justice systems.
In order to identify the effect of increased state capacity on social identity, we use the highly disaggregated
information contained within the Cahiers de Doléances sent to the Estates General in 1789. Confronted with
an intractable fiscal situation in 1788, Louis XVI agreed to the calling of the French representative assembly
known as the Estates General for the first time since 1614. In anticipation of the debates which would
emerge from the meeting, every baillage (town or village) in France was asked to compile a list of grievances.
Representatives of each Estate (first = clergy, second = nobility, and third = everyone else) in each town were
given the opportunity to submit one of these documents.3 These baillage-level Cahiers were sent to the capital
of the electoral district in which they were located. Then, each of these approximately 200 electoral districts
summarized the baillage Cahiers for each estate into a ‘General’ Cahier. It is these General Cahiers that we
use to measure regional identification with the king or the French state. This task is made possible because
of the work of Beatrice Hyslop who, in the 1930’s, undertook the massive endeavor to read and analyze all
the General Cahiers with an eye toward the question of what types of ‘nationalism’ existed across France on
the eve of the Revolution (Hyslop, 1934, 1936). Importantly for the current study, Hyslop was unconcerned
with the particular research question of this paper - ‘Whether greater national identification was associated
with being located in the Cinq Grosses Fermes?’ Indeed, she hardly mentions fiscal boundaries in her work
and draws no definite links between a region’s membership in the CGF and any of the forty-nine variables
she codes for each of the Cahiers.
These two historical sources - the geographic and fiscal reality of the CGF region along with the data on
national identity provided by the Cahiers de Doléances - allow us to show a robust association between state
capacity and national identity by comparing the reported national identity of similar groups ‘close’ to both
sides of the CGF border. This focus on the local treatment effect of the CGF border results in an estimate of
the effect of state capacity on national identity that is less subject to bias due to unobservables than simply
3In general, the third estate represented urban interests rather than peasant, agricultural, interests.
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comparing groups inside the CGF to those outside (the average treatment effect). This is because CGF and
non-CGF regions close to the border are more likely to have similar characteristics than regions more distant
from the border. We will confirm this is the case by comparing the values of observables on both sides of the
border in Section 4. In particular, we are confident that the association we show between fiscal capacity and
national identity does not stem from geographic factors or differences in initial political institutions – such as
whether the region used civil or customary law – which we explicitly control for. We also show that migration
is unlikely to explain this correlation using data on urban populations from Bairoch (1988). Finally, we show
that linguistic diversity – as proxied by the literacy of regional populations from Furet and Ozouf (1977) –
also does not explain the association between fiscal capacity and the development of national identity. We
conclude that the development of state capacity in Early-Modern France played a robust role in fostering
norms in favor of national, as opposed to local, institutions before the Revolution.
In addition to the literatures on state capacity and rule of law mentioned above, this paper touches on several
other topics of concern to social scientists. It follows in the tradition of a recent microeconomics literature
which uses within country variation to measure the effect of institutions on economic development (e.g.
Banerjee and Iyer (2005), Iyer (2010), and Dell (2010)).4 In particular, we build on work by those such as
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) and Dincecco (2009) who argue that historically strong states helped
generate economic development.5 Unlike these authors, however, we are able to show an explicit link between
state capacity and nascent support for national institutions – thereby providing a plausible mechanism through
which early state building led to economic development. We also provide empirical evidence which contributes
to the debate on whether formal state institutions crowd-in or crowd-out informal norms of cooperation. For
example, Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) and Lowes et al. (2015) both find crowding-out. Tabellini (2010)
and Becker et al. (2014), by contrast, find crowding-in. The evidence we present on the stated preferences for
uniformly shared institutions in the Cahiers as well as our findings concerning local public goods spending is
consistent with the crowding-in argument.
This paper also contributes to the historical literature on the origins of the French Revolution, and more
specifically, French Revolutionary nationalism, at the end of the Old Regime. Many of these studies focus on
questions related to the present work such as linguistic or religious affiliation and Revolutionary sentiment
(de Certeau et al., 2002; Bell, 1995).6 Historians such as Hyslop (1934) and Shapiro et al. (1998) did tremen-
dous work compiling and studying the contents of the Cahiers de Doléances, often with an analytical eye
towards the origins of French Revolutionary nationalistic sentiment. To the extent that they relate national
identification with what we term state capacity here, however, they focus on average treatment effects in their
formal analysis. For example, Markoff (1998) looks at the correlation between a region being a pays d’état
4Recent papers focusing specifically on institutions associated with political and economic borders include Pinkovskiy (2013),
Schulze and Wolf (2009), and Ploeckl (2013).
5A closely related argument is that of Bockstette et al. (2002) who argue that older states are associated with greater
economic development.
6More generally, it is difficult to over-state the influence of Anderson (1991) on the study by national sentiment within the
humanities and its resultant emphasis on print culture.
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(less monarchical control) versus a pays d’éléction (more monarchical control) and the degree of agreement
between First and Second Estates on various issues brought up in the Cahiers. This is a valuable analysis,
however, the correlations he presents fall short of presenting a robust relationship between state capacity and
national identity, which is a prime focus of the present study.7 Our analysis is also closely related to studies of
internal variation in ancien regime institutions and subsequent economic performance. For example, Le Bris
(2015) investigates whether a region using customary versus roman law influences early nineteenth century
development. Daudin (2010) uses data on product prices to show that at the end of the eighteenth century
individuals within the Cinq Grosses Fermes tended not to trade with those outside of it. Our results suggest,
however, that the political and economic implications of the CGF tariff region went well beyond the dead-
weight losses from foregone trades. Social preferences were molded differently inside the CGF than outside it
– and to such an extent that economic outcomes were better in the nineteenth century.
More generally, our work supports those who argue that preferences matter for economic development. For
example Hirschman (1977), Nunn (2012), and the empirical work of Hoff and Pandey (2014) on caste identity
versus national identity in India. Furthermore, given the unique role played by France as an early participant
in the Industrial Revolution, our argument complements the work of those who claim preference changes
mattered in the transition to modern economic growth in Europe. Specifically, McCloskey (2010) claims there
was a ‘bourgeois revolution’ in which individuals adopted attitudes towards markets that were conducive to
growth. Similarly, Mokyr (2005) emphasizes the Baconian Revolution as a turning point in ability of European
society to generate and implement scientific ideas. Our unique contribution in this paper is to identify an
important historical mechanism – increases in state capacity – through which preferences were formed and
directed towards broader goals, such as the creation of common institutions governing market exchange.
2 State Capacity, Preferences, and Cooperation
We make two arguments in this paper: (1) Increases in state capacity in Early-Modern France were closely
associated with increased preferences for national, as opposed to local, political and economic institutions. (2)
Areas which affiliated with a national identity at the end of the eighteenth century achieved higher economic
development in the first half of the nineteenth century. In this section we will briefly survey the literatures
addressing two questions: What is state capacity? How might increases in state capacity generate preferences
which favor formal and informal institutions that are national rather than local?
In ‘Politics as a Vocation’ Max Weber defines states as political communities that ‘. . . claim a monopoly on
the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Weber, 1946, 1918). More recently, researchers
have operationalized Weber’s definition as consisting of two, measurable, characteristics: (1) The ability to
extract revenue, or fiscal capacity, and (2) the ability to enforce rules, or legal capacity. Fiscal and legal
7To reiterate, however, the collected articles in Shapiro et al. (1998) and in Markoff (2010) are in broad agreement with the
present, general thesis, that stronger states are conducive to the creation of individuals with less particularistic interests.
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capacity tend to be positively correlated with each other or, to use the terminology of Besley and Persson
(2011), they ‘cluster’. It is very rare to observe a polity with either high taxes and an inability to enforce
rules or low taxes and an effective legal environment. As such, and given the difficulties of measuring legal
capacity, most historical studies focus on just fiscal capacity in order to trace the development of the state
over time (e.g. Dincecco (2009)). In Europe, these studies show that around the end of the sixteenth century,
state capacity was dramatically increasing in places like England, France, the Low Countries, and Prussia.8
But what effect did these increases in capacity have? Aside from imposing some minimal rules that probably
facilitated trade and eventually allowed for greater investment in education (see, e.g., Epstein (2000), Dincecco
(2009), and Johnson and Koyama (2014b)), is it possible that individuals living in high state capacity regions
actually had their preferences molded so that they were more likely to identify themselves with the newly
powerful governments which were taxing them? Historians and sociologists have been aware of this possibility
for some time. Most famously, one of the main themes in Tocqueville (1998) is that the French Revolution
would have never been possible if the institutions of the absolute monarchy had not been so successful in
undermining the feudal regime during the eighteenth century.9
In economics, one of the more influential arguments concerning the importance of preferences for economic
development is Hirschman (1977). For him, the increasing importance of markets, or ‘doux commerce’,
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had a profound effect on what individuals valued. The shift
was from treating money-making as shameful and personal honor as paramount, towards a more ‘modern’
outlook which valued individualism and market institutions. More recently, McCloskey (2010) has pursued
the argument that it was a change in beliefs (as manifested in the rhetoric of individuals) which made possible
the Great Divergence in incomes of the late eighteenth century and signaled the onset of modern economic
growth.
For Hirschman (1977) the driving force behind preference changes was trade. For McCloskey (2010) it was
a combination of the Reformation, the printing press, and the revolutions of the late early-modern period.
Recently, however, Tocqueville’s view that strong states may play a significant role in forming individual
preferences has received support from work in behavioral economics. In particular, experimental work by
Fehr et al. (2008) and Hoff and Pandey (2014) suggests that the values people affiliate with can be strongly
affected by the institutions which surround them.10 Additionally, historical work by Becker et al. (2014) and
Lowes et al. (2015) explicitly investigates how the strength of formal political institutions can have a long-run
8For the overall picture after 1600, see Dincecco (2009), the essays in Bonney (1995), and Karaman and Pamuk (2013). For
a classic treatment of England, see Brewer (1988). For a more recent attempt at endogenizing the explanation for investment in
capacity in England and France, see Johnson and Koyama (2014a).
9The role of state power in affecting individual beliefs is a common theme of historians, especially since the work of Foucault
(1977) which influenced many subsequent studies (for example, Sabean (1987) or Rebel (1983)). In sociology, Swidler (1986)
argues that the ‘ascriptive’ identity of individuals can be influenced by external institutions and can shift relatively quickly
during periods of instability. This theme is built upon by Ross and Nisbett (1991) who discuss the work in social psychology
supporting the idea that the social identity of individuals is strongly influenced by their environment.
10For a recent survey of this work in behavioral economics, see Fehr and Hoff (2011).
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impact on informal norms of cooperative behavior.
There are also theoretical studies which support the idea that a high capacity state can mold the preferences
of individuals to favor norms of cooperation. In particular, Acemoglu and Jackson (2014) argue that in
societies with forward looking individuals it is possible for a ‘prominent agent’ to reverse a history of non-
cooperative play through it’s actions. While most of the motivating examples provided by Acemoglu and
Jackson (2014) concern individuals (e.g. Mandela in South Africa or Gandhi in India) one could also interpret
their prominent agent as a high capacity state. Another line of research by Gintis (2014, 2010) develops a
theoretical framework to explain the emergence of cooperation based on the concept of correlated equilibrium
Aumann (1987). In this setting a ‘choreographer’ signals to agents how to play in a coordination game.
Importantly, the choreographer can be interpreted as either an informal institution (e.g. norms concerning
generalized trust) or a formal institution (e.g. regulations concerning weights and measures, taxation, or
education). In Appendix A we present an outline of this theory based on Gintis (2014) to show explicitly how
cooperation in a coordination game can be increased by the presence of a state acting as a choreographer of
a correlated equilibrium.
It is, therefore, possible that the changes in preferences highlighted by Hirschman (1977), McCloskey (2010)
and others that laid the foundations for modern economic growth may have been largely a by-product of
the increases in state capacity that occurred between 1500 and 1800 in Europe. In particular, these changes
were characterized by a shift in social preferences such that individuals affiliated less with particularistic and
local institutions. Instead, they started thinking of themselves as citizens in a shared national culture. One
consequence of this was that they also became more concerned with dismantling local institutions in favor of
the new national institutions. This manifested itself as a desire to standardize economic and legal institutions
and to eliminate the vestiges of the feudal regime such as serfdom (we will investigate these claims specifically
in Section 6.1).
The evidence for the importance of preferences in generating positive political and economic outcomes is
extensive. There is also evidence that changing preferences played an important role in what is probably the
most important event in modern economic history, the Great Divergence. What is less clear is what caused
this change in preferences. In what follows below, we will present evidence from Old Regime France that
suggests Tocqueville was right when he asserted that it was state capacity (the strong absolute monarchy)
that ‘ironed out the diversities’ of the French people and made possible the political and economic changes
of the Revolution and beyond.
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3 Historical Background and Data
3.1 The Cinq Grosses Fermes and French Fiscal Capacity Before and After 1664
Before Louis XIV took power in 1661, the French fiscal system was characterized by a wildly confusing
amalgam of both direct and indirect taxes. The indirect taxes were mainly the octrois, péages, and various
adjunct taxes to the aides, traites, and gabelles. The octrois were primarily taxes on collected at city gates
and included the huge fiscal resource of the entrées de paris. The aides were mainly excises on wine and other
spirits. These and the droits de marque on iron, oil, soap, paper, cloth, and leather, were often collected as
border tariffs in the regions in which they were imposed. Also, movement of salt or tobacco was often taxed
on border of the gabelles and tabac regions. The main direct taxes were the taille, the capitation (permanent
from 1704), and the first and second vingtièmes (from 1749 and 1760 respectively) (see Heckscher (1955,
78-93) and Bosher (1964, 1-5)). These latter taxes, at least in theory, were supposed to be surtaxes of 5%
each on the income of all Frenchmen. In practice, however, they were resisted and manipulated with varying
levels of success by provincial and class interests at all levels.11
Onto this scene Louis XIV’s finance minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, arrived with ambitious ideas for reform.
Colbert was mercantilist and wanted primarily to adjust border taxes so as to favor the export of French
finished goods and the import of raw materials from abroad. This implied high export taxes at the border on
raw materials and low import taxes. Similarly, it implied low export taxes on finished goods, but high import
taxes on these items. This plan for a customs union with unified export and import taxes on the border was
described by Colbert in a document of 18 September, 1664. He succeeded in bringing about half the country
into this unified customs union and placed the management of taxes in it under a group of tax farmers known
as the Cinq Grosses Fermes.12 The end result were two separate tax regions: The Cinq Grosses Fermes in
the center and The Provinces Reputed Foreign in the East, South, and West (See Bosher (1964, 5-9) and
Heckscher (1955, 96-102)).13
The proposed unified customs union was not accepted by all the provinces, but was instead centered on the
11A telling anecdote is that when the second vingtième was introduced there was an attempt at the same time to introduce a
general land survey by the monarchy’s Finance minister Henri Léonard Jean Baptiste Bertin. This was was fiercely resisted by
the parlements (legislators) across the country since they didn’t want the government to know how much they had (and could
therefore tax).
12For more background on tax farming see Johnson (2006), Balla and Johnson (2009), and the citations therein. The original
Cinq Grosses Fermes were the (1) traite foraine, le rêve et le haut passage de Champagne et de Normandie, (2) la traite foraine
de Normandie, (3) le traite domaniale de Champagne, Picardie, Normandie, et Bourgogne, (4) la douane de Lyon, and (5) les
droits d’entrée sur l’épicieries, drogueries et grosses denrées. These were united under the ownership of René Brunet in 1589.
The process was pushed through during the high period of the wars of religion by a cash strapped Henri iii (r. 1574-1589) (Roux,
1916, 70-73). The reasons for unification were, in all likelihood, as more due to a desire to increase the amount of lending the
farms could support than to gain administrative efficiencies (Johnson and Koyama, 2014a).
13The Provinces Reputed Foreign were Angoumois, Artois, Auvergne, lower Navarre, Béarn, Brittany, Cambrésis, Foix,
Dauphiné, Flanders, Forez, Franch-Compté, Gascony, Guyenne, Hainaut, Ile-de-Rhé, Ile d’Oléron, Languedoc, Limousin, Lyon-
nais (in parts, see below), Marche, Provence, Roussillon, Rouergue, Saintonge, and Vivarais.
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traditional lands of the Bourbon monarchs (these will be described in detail in section 3.2 below).14 As such,
the CGF border was not necessarily random and this is a threat to our identification strategy. One piece
of evidence suggesting that this is not an important threat to our results is that Hyslop finds no evidence
for the nationalist sentiment she observes in the General Cahiers of 1789 in the Cahiers compiled for the
Estates General of 1614 – about fifty years before the creation of the CGF border (Hyslop, 1934, 59-63).
Nonetheless, we will deal with the potential endogeneity of the border in several ways. First, we will include
a host of control variables covering geographic, political, and cultural factors. Second, we will focus on the
local treatment effect and will show that as we compare regions closer to the CGF boundary, differences
on observables disappear. This suggests, that regions close to each other but on opposite sides of the CGF
boundary were very similar. Third, in section 3 we will attempt to test for differences in linguistic background
and for potential selection due to migration.
The creation of the CGF unleashed a process which plausibly had a profound impact on the desire of French
citizens for reform as well as on their likelihood to identify themselves in relation to either the institutions of
the monarchy or those of a more local character. In particular, Bosher (1964, 13-15) says of the Company
of General Farms, ‘The methods of collection had been reformed [by Colbert] without reforming the system
of duties.’ As this quote suggests, as a result of the creation of the CGF, two processes unfolded: (1) There
was suppression of local, or seigneurial, control of fiscal instruments, especially within the area of the CGF
(Heckscher, 1955, 103-106).15 (2) There was a dramatic increase in the amount of exactions, especially within
the area of the CGF (we will provide extensive evidence for this in section 4 below).
To see how these two factors conspired to affect opinion about economic reform and national affiliation,
consider that the creation of the internal tariff barriers raised the cost of commerce significantly – and that
the more barriers one had to cross, the greater this distortion. Thus, for example, in 1702 Jean Anisson de
Hauteroche, deputy of Commerce for Lyon, in writing up a reform project for internal customs emphasized
that they raised the price of French goods by between 6 and 15 percent (Bosher, 1964, 32).
Furthermore, these distortions had different effects on citizens depending on whether they lived inside or
outside the CGF. Inside the CGF the tax system was particularly baroque and oppressive. This meant that
individuals received a high return for learning how to work within the system. Thus, members of the nobility
often focused on confirming their noble heritage (as ratified through the institutions of the monarchy) so as
to retain their exemptions and privileges (Conchon, 2002). Likewise, members of the third estate, who were
often represented by bourgeois merchants, had to learn to work within the tax and legal system to survive.
This also meant individuals inside the CGF were more focused on a discussion of reform of monarchical
14An important exception to this observation is Burgundy. It was in the CGF but also had a strong history of independence
as the Kingdom of Burgundy. Indeed, the civil conflict known as the Fronde (1648-53) was led by princes from Burgundy who
were attempting to overthrow the Bourbons.
15Thus, for example, in 1724 the royal commission on péages started investigating who had legitimate claim and to confiscate
those that didn’t. The commission claimed to have reduced the number of tolls from 5,688 to 2,054 during the reign of Louis
XV. By 1789 there were supposed to be only 1,600 (Bosher, 1964, 2).
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institutions. Outside the CGF, by contrast, trade and life in general was more oriented away from the center
of the country and more likely to be with foreigners. Thus, the eastern region of Metz, for example, was
opposed to tax reform at the end of the eighteenth century (‘the single tariff project’) because they were
content with focusing on foreign trade Bosher (1964, 135).
3.2 The Construction of the Cinq Grosses Fermes Boundary
To determine which Hyslop cities are included within the boundary of the Cinq Grosses Fermes we use the
following procedure. As a first cut, we use the entry on ‘Cinq Grosses Fermes’ in le Rond d’Alembert and
Diderot (1784) as the source for the delineation of the CGF border. The relevant entry is reproduced in
Appendix B, Figure 8. The entry lists all the provinces included within the border of the CGF as described
in Colbert’s ordinance of 1664. For our baseline estimates, we also include Lyon since, as explained in
Appendix B, Figure 9, Lyon was granted special status with ‘privileged communications’ with the CGF.16
After establishing the provinces contained in the CGF we then used the shapefiles of French provinces provided
by Euratlas (2012) to reproduce a first-cut at the boundary.
The CGF boundary did not actually perfectly correspond to the borders of the provinces delineated in the
1664 ordinance. Thus, in the second step, we use two sources to check on membership status of each Hyslop
city individually. The first source we use is Saugrain (1720) which was a population census commissioned at
the end of the seventeenth century.17 With the Saugrain (1720) census we confirm whether each Hyslop city
is in a CGF province as defined by the 1664 edict. We next consult Expilly (1768) which is an eighteenth
century geographic dictionary. It contains entries for most of the Hyslop cities and explains their legal and
economic status. Where there is not an explicit entry for the city, we use the relevant entry on the province
or the généralité (another fiscal unit) in which the city was located (as recorded in Saugrain (1720)), which
in all cases is sufficient to explain whether the city is in or out of the CGF. After confirming the status of
the Hyslop cities, we adjust the initial boundary of the CGF border accordingly using GIS software. The
resulting border is illustrated in Figure 2 below along with the Hyslop cities.
3.3 Measuring Fiscal Capacity at the End of the Old Regime
In order to establish that fiscal capacity was greater in the region of the Cinq Grosses Fermes than in the
rest of the country we rely on data on taxes per capita recorded by Jacques Necker, the finance minister of
Louis XVI, in 1784. In his De l’administration des finances de la France, Necker recorded for almost every
tax district the total taxes per capita collected by the monarchy.18 These include both direct and indirect
taxes.19 The tax district boundaries in 1700 are illustrated in Figure 1. Since our analysis of the Cahiers will
be done at the city rather than the province level, we use GIS software to extract the values of taxes p.c.
16We also repeat the analysis with Lyon excluded in in Section 4, Table 3.
17The exact origins and methods used to construct the Saugrain census are uncertain. However, the institutional information
it contains is much more precise than the actual population estimates (Hussenet, 1996).
18These data are reproduced in Nordman and Ozouf-Marignier (1989).
19The tax districts, of which there were about 31 in 1784, were originally created in 1542 by Francis I (Wolfe, 1972).
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for each city in each province. To account for the resulting correlation in fiscal capacity across cities, we will
cluster standard errors at the province level in all regressions. We call the resulting fiscal capacity measure
Log Taxes per capita.
We assume the level of taxes per capita at the district level in 1784 is a good proxy for increases in fiscal
capacity due to the creation of the CGF in 1664. This is a safe assumption since fiscal capacity was relatively
low throughout France before the accession of Louis XIV in 1661. In Appendix C we describe in detail these
fiscal changes during the second half of the seventeenth century.
Figure 1: The borders of the provinces in
1700.
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Figure 2: Cities of origin for the General
Cahiers and the CGF boundary.
3.4 The Cahiers de Doléances and Hyslop’s Coding
The locations of the cities in which the General Cahiers were compiled and then sent to Paris are shown in
Figure 2. As can be seen from the map, their distribution is not uniform. Particularly in the south-central
and western regions of the country the distance between Cahiers observations is further than in the east.
The main outcome variable we use is called National Identity and comes from the coding of the General
Cahiers by Hyslop (1934) for various degrees of what she terms ‘nationalism’.20 To Hyslop, nationalism was
a ‘common consciousness’ that manifested itself on four different margins as shared ‘French’ notions of: (1)
geography, (2) race, (3) traditions and, (4) formal institutions (a ‘desire for uniformity’) (Hyslop, 1934, ch 3).
‘Geography’ is interpreted by Hyslop, and coded accordingly, as a recognition of defined national boundaries
for an entity called ‘France’. ‘Race’ consists of references in the Cahiers to supposed shared French ‘virtues’,
or, more commonly, notions of citizenship. ‘Traditions’ include references to a shared French ‘Constitution’,
a common religion, a common language, or the desirability of a national plan for educational instruction.
‘Formal institutions’ (or what Hyslop refers to as a ‘desire for uniformity’) include references to legal and ad-
20Hyslop also published an extensive guide to her analyses as Hyslop (1936).
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ministrative uniformity or economic uniformity. This last category, is of particular relevance for the influence
of the CGF on national sentiment and, as such, we will investigate the relationship between membership in
the CGF and the desire for uniformity in greater detail in Section 6.1.
Hyslop counts the instances in which each of these four characteristics (and their sub-components) of national
sentiment appear in each of the General Cahiers. She then constructs a single index out of her sub-indexes in
which she records for each Estate whether ‘national patriotism is strongest (to the king or Nation)’, ‘loyalties
were mixed’, ‘loyalties to localities, class, or both outweigh national patriotism’, or, ‘no sentiment towards
nation or locality is shown’. We code these entries as 3, 2, 1, and ‘missing’ respectively. As such, the main
outcome variable, Identity runs from 3 to 1. We then take the average of this number over the Cahiers for
the nobility and the third estates as the main outcome variable to measure National Identity.21
4 Analysis
4.1 Data Descriptions and Balance of Observables
The identification strategy is to investigate the discontinuity in national sentiment close to the border of
the CGF. This regression discontinuity approach should provide an unbiased estimate of the effect of state
capacity on national identification assuming that regions close to the border are relatively similar and if the
membership in the CGF results in a ‘treatment’ of living under state institutions with higher fiscal capacity.
As a first cut at seeing if there is some relationship between national sentiment and membership in the CGF,
Figure 3 illustrates the spatial distribution of the value of the variable National Identity. In the Figure, a
heat map of the value of National Identity is created based on the inverse weight of it’s value for each of
the surrounding 12 cities for each grid on the map. Visual inspection of the map provides support for the
hypothesis that regions within the CGF were more likely to identify themselves with France or the king, in
1789. With the notable exception of the Gironde (Bordeaux) and La Rochelle regions in the mid-west and, to
a lesser extent, the area around Dijon in the mid-east, the discontinuity at the border in national sentiment
appears large and robust.
21We exclude the cahiers of the clergy and the relatively small number of ‘unified’ cahiers in which the grievances of all three
estates are lumped together. The rationale for excluding the clergy is that their identities were more likely affected by religious
policy than tax policy. Including the clergy results in slightly smaller coefficients in the baseline regressions, but our main results
are largely supported. These regressions are available upon request.
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Figure 3: National Identity in the 1789 General Cahiers. Darker color represents greater identification
in the Cahiers by the Nobility and Third Estate with either the ‘King’ or ‘France’ according to Hyslop
(1934). Each grid point in map assigned a value based on the inverse-weighted distance of surrounding
12 cities that sent in Cahiers (exponent of distance used is the default of 2). The Cinq Grosses Fermes
region is delineated in red and treated as a barrier.
In order for the identification strategy to be convincing, the characteristics (other than national affiliation)
of nearby regions on either side of the CGF border should be similar. Since we can’t test whether potentially
important unobservable characteristics differ, in Table 1 we instead investigate whether our identifying as-
sumption holds for the observables which we will also be including as control variables. In columns (1), (2),
and (3) we show the average value of each control variable outside the CGF, inside the CGF, and the difference
between the two. In brackets under the difference we report the p-value of a two-sided t-test of significance.
In columns (4) - (6) we report the statistics on the variables for only the cities within 150 kilometers of the
CGF boundary. In columns (7)-(9) we report the statistics for only the cities within 75 kilometers of the
boundary. If our identification strategy is appropriate, differences in variables for cities inside and outside
the CGF should decrease as we restrict our sample to the area closer to the boundary.
The control variables we investigate are the following (see Appendix F for more details on the control vari-
ables): Urban measures urban density around the city and is constructed using data on all cities in France
with populations greater than 5,000 in 1800 provided in Bosker et al. (2013). Wheat Suitability data come
from the FAO and are described in Fischer et al. (2002). These data are constructed by combining char-
acteristics of wheat (optimal growing temperature, soil type, etc.) with highly disaggregated climatic and
geographic data covering variables such as precipitation, cloud cover, ground-frost frequency, soil types and
slope characteristics. The data have a spatial resolution of 0.5 degree x 0.5 degree (or about 60 x 60 kilome-
ters at 45 degrees latitude, typical for France). We extract the wheat suitability for each of our cities using
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geospatial software. Ruggedness is from Sappington et al. (2007) and measures the variation in the altitude of
the terrain surrounding each city. DRivers and DSeas are simply measures of the distance of each city from
major rivers and seas contained in the Euratlas (2012) shapefiles. Communes is from the Bosker et al. (2013)
dataset and measure the average number of cities in the province the Hyslop city is located in that had some
form of self-governance. Bishoprics and Archbishoprics are similarly constructed measures made using the
Bosker et al. (2013) data and indicate how close the Hyslop city is to major centers of the Catholic religion.
Universities is also constructed using the Bosker et al. (2013) data and measures how many cities, on average,
had a major university in the province of the Hyslop city. Finally, the two main dependent variables we focus
on, Log Taxes per capita and National Identity, are constructed as described above in sections 3.3 and 3.4.
Column (3) of Table 1 indicates that, using the full sample, four variables - Urban, DSeas, Bishoprics, and
Communes - are all shown to be significantly different outside the CGF than inside. Furthermore, Universities
is significant at the 0.104 level and DRivers is also very close. When we restrict the sample to cities within
150 kilometers of the CGF boundary, only Urban and Communes retain their significance. Most of the
other differences in the variables become much less significant. When the sample is restricted to cities only
75 kilometers from the boundary, then Communes continues to be significant and DSeas becomes barely
significant at the 10 % level. All the other variables are indistinguishable from zero. This suggests that,
at the border of the CGF, at least on observables, regions were fairly similar. Given our relatively small
sample of cities (only 208 in the full sample), it is not clear whether 150 km or 75 km is the more appropriate
distance to investigate for the local treatment effect. For example, at 75 km there are only 29 cities in the
CGF group. Because of this, we will report estimates of the local treatment effect of the CGF boundary for
all three samples (full, 150 km, and 75 km) for most regressions. Only when we focus on individual border
segments will we restrict ourselves to using the full data set due to sample size considerations.
In the last two rows of Table 1 we show that the two main outcome variables - Log Taxes per capita and
National Identity - are significantly different between cities inside and outside the CGF regardless of how close
we approach the border. Furthermore, these are large differences. In the full sample, a standard deviation in
Log Taxes per capita is 0.39 whereas the CGF cities pay, on average 0.57 more in taxes per person. Similarly,
a standard deviation in National Identity is about 0.61 whereas the value of the variable is about 0.51 higher
in cities inside the CGF boundary. Furthermore, these differences in the outcome variables are stable as we
restrict our attention to cities closer to the border. This suggests that the local average treatment effects we
estimate below are also relevant more globally.
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Inside CGF Outside CGF Difference Inside CGF Outside CGF Difference Inside CGF Outside CGF Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Urban 35.24 21.34 -13.90*** 25.86 21.25 -4.62** 21.88 21.09 -0.79
[0.000] [0.0391] [0.626]
Wheat Suitability 3.56 3.65 0.09 3.65 3.52 -0.13 3.62 3.57 -0.06
[0.609] [0.553] [0.842]
Ruggedness 0.72 0.69 -0.03 0.73 0.69 -0.04 0.72 0.67 -0.06
[0.234] [0.213] [0.234]
DRivers 57555.46 73887.09 16331.63 63189.89 60201.12 -2988.776 67979.8 59884.77 -8095.029
[0.131] [0.804] [0.628]
DSeas 198996.9 160707.4 -38289.57** 184022.6 202359.4 18336.79 144701.3 194888.5 50187.22*
[0.022] [0.391] [0.076]
Communes 0.63 0.48 -0.15*** 0.65 0.36 -0.29*** 0.69 0.40 -0.29***
[0.006] [0.000] [0.002]
Bishoprics 0.48 0.31 -0.18*** 0.39 0.25 -0.15*** 0.33 0.24 -0.09
[0.000] [0.006] [0.158]
Archbishoprics 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.08 -0.02 0.08 0.10 0.02
[0.407] [0.566] [0.725]
Universities 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.02
[0.104] [0.783] [0.674]
Log Taxes per capita 3.33 2.75 -0.574*** 3.18 2.73 -0.46*** 3.16 2.75 -0.411***
(n=73) (n=130) [0.000] (n=51) (n=71) [0.000] (n=29) (n=46) [0.000]
National Identity 2.44 1.93 -0.51*** 2.39 1.87 -0.52*** 2.41 1.91 -0.50***
(2nd & 3rd Estates) (n=69) (n=110) [0.000] (n=48) (n=60) [0.000] (n=27) (n=39) [0.000]
Observations 73 135 208 51 71 122 29 46 75
Full Sample <150 km of  CGF Boundary <75km of  CGF Boundary
Table 1: The Balance of Observables Inside and Outside the Cinq Grosses Fermes. Columns (1), (2), and (3) give the raw averages
and diﬀerences, along with p-values (in brackets) of a ttest of no diﬀerence in the variables. *, **, and *** represent 1%, 5%, and
10% significance respectively. Columns (4), (5), and (6) show the same statistics using only cities within 150 kilometers of the CGF
boundary. Columns (7), (8), and (9) do the same analysis for cities within 75 kilometers of the CGF boundary.
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4.2 Baseline Estimates
While Table 1 is reassuring for our identification strategy and suggests support for our main hypothesis, we
would like to estimate the local treatment effect of the border while controlling for potentially confounding
variables we can observe. To do this, we use OLS to estimate the following regression equation:
yi = α + β CGFi + f(geographic locationi) + θ Urbani +G
0
i ·Λ+ εi (1)
Where yi is either the value of Log Taxes per capita from Necker or the Hyslop measure of National Identity
for General Cahier city i. CGF is a dummy variable equal to one if the city is located in the Cinq Grosses
Fermes. f(geographic locationi) is either a set of spatial trends on both sides of the CGF boundary or a third
order polynomial in the latitude and longitude of the cities.22 We will investigate several different functional
forms for the spatial trends, however, in most regressions we will report estimates from specifications that
include either linear or cubic trends. Urbani is our measure of urban density. G
0
i is a vector of geographic
(Wheat Suitability, Ruggedness, DRivers, and DSeas), religious (Bishoprics and Archbishoprics), educational
(Universities), and political (Communes) controls. εi is an iid error term.
Table 2 reports the results from estimating Equation 2 for our two outcome variables using the full sample
as well as using only cities 150 km and 75 km from the CGF boundary. We report the value of β, which is
the coefficient of interest. We are testing two hypotheses in Table 2. First, were cities within the CGF taxed
at a higher rate than those outside (i.e. was fiscal capacity higher in the CGF)? Second, did cities inside the
CGF have a greater affiliation with national as opposed to local identity?
Regressions (1)-(3) provide strong support for the first hypothesis. Cities located within the CGF were taxed
significantly higher than those outside. According to the estimate using the full sample and linear trends
(Panel A), a city in the CGF paid approximately 27% more in taxes per capita than a city outside. When we
restrict our attention to cities within 75 km of the boundary, this estimate increases to 39%. The estimates
are somewhat less robust to using a quartic trend, though the sizes of the coefficients are still quite large (24%
at 75 km) even when we narrow the sample. Under estimation using the cubic polynomial in latitude and
longitude, the coefficients are similar in magnitude to those in Panels A and B, though they are also more
precisely estimated.
22Following Dell (2010), the specific polynomial we use is x+y+x2+y2+xy+x3+y3+x2y+xy2, where x denotes longitude
and y denotes latitude.
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Full Sample <150 km <75 km Full Sample <150 km <75 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CGF Dummy 0.266** 0.324** 0.388** 0.669*** 0.679*** 0.707**
(0.116) (0.148) (0.161) (0.154) (0.236) (0.253)
R-sq 0.671 0.557 0.473 0.222 0.237 0.204
CGF Dummy 0.448** 0.211 0.238 0.624** 1.319** 0.566
(0.169) (0.152) (0.251) (0.290) (0.560) (0.878)
R-sq 0.677 0.582 0.457 0.237 0.227 0.250
CGF Dummy 0.378*** 0.414*** 0.382*** 0.532*** 0.571*** 0.606***
(0.0827) (0.0775) (0.0800) (0.119) (0.119) (0.134)
R-sq 0.722 0.715 0.759 0.275 0.246 0.274
Spatial Trends Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pop Density Control Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geography Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 203 122 75 179 108 66
Rel., Educ., & Political 
Controls
Dependent Variable
Log Taxes Per Capita National Identity (2nd & 3rd Estates)
Panel C:  Cubic Polynomial in Latitude and Longitude
Panel A:  Linear Polynomial in Distance to CGF Border
Panel B:  Cubic Polynomial in Distance to CGF Border
Table 2: The Eﬀect of the Cinq Grosses Fermes Border on National Identity : Baseline Estimates.
Estimates set the entire land border of the CGF as 0 distance. Dependent variable is either Log Taxes per
capita or National Identity. Robust standard errors clustered on province reported in parentheses. *, **,
and *** represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance respectively.
Our second hypothesis, that greater state capacity causes greater national affiliation, implies that the β coef-
ficient should be positive and significant. This is precisely what is found in the estimates in columns (4)-(6).
Assuming linear trends (Panel A) and using the full sample, a city inside the CGF boundary has about a one
standard deviation higher affiliation with National Identity than a city just outside the border. Furthermore,
the effect size remains relatively stable as we restrict the sample to cities closer to the border. Under the
cubic spatial trend specification in Panel B, these results are supported for the full sample and restricting
the sample to cities within 150 km of the boundary. It is only under the most restrictive specification, using
just the 66 cities within 75 km of the border, that the estimate becomes imprecise. Though even then, it’s
economic significance is still large (β = 0.57). In Panel C, using the cubic polynomials in latitude and lon-
gitude, the coefficients are large, precisely estimated, and stable as the border is approached. The estimate
of 0.61 in Column (6), Panel C suggests individuals just inside the CGF border have about a one standard
deviation greater affiliation with National Identity compared to those just outside the CGF.
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Overall, the results in Table 2 support our claim from section 3.1 that fiscal capacity was much greater within
the region of the CGF. They also support our primary hypothesis that citizens living in regions with higher
fiscal capacity were more likely to identify with national as opposed to local institutions. We illustrate these
results visually in Figure 4.23 In the Figure distance to the CGF border is on the x-axis (negative is inside the
CGF) and the value of national identification is on the y-axis. The values of Identity averaged over province
are graphed along with the quartic fit of these against distance from the border after partialling out the
control variables.24 The vertical distance between the fitted line at ‘0’ distance from the CGF border is the
estimated treatment effect.
The Figure does raise a couple potential concerns that we will address in the sections below. First, as we
mentioned above in reference to Figure 3, the Gironde and La Rochelle regions in the west are outliers. The
cities in the province of La Rochelle (Rochefort, St. Jean, La Rochelle, and Saintes) are actually split by the
CGF boundary. Also, the relatively prosperous city of Bordeaux and it’s surrounding regions exhibits much
higher national identification than other cities in the South. In Section 4 below we will address this potential
source of bias in our estimates by investigating the treatment effect of CGF membership on cities near the
individual border segments of the West, South, and East separately.
Another potential source of concern is that Lyon appears to be an influential observation. This could be
inappropriate given our decision to include it as a CGF city due to its special status. Because of this concern,
we will show in section 3 below that our results are robust to the exclusion of Lyon from the sample.
23The figure is generated using a local polynomial regression with a bandwidth of 200,000 meters and allowing for fourth
order polynomials.
24The average distance of the individual cities from the border within the province is used as the ‘distance’ of the province
from the border.
17
Taxes, National Identity, and Nation Building Johnson
Paris
Orleans
Bourges
Moulins
Lyon
LaRochelle
Poitiers
Tours
Caen
Alencon
Rouen
Amiens
Soissons
Chalons
Dijon
Moulins
Riom
Montpellier
Toulouse
Perpignan
Auch
Bourdeaux
Limoges
LaRochelle
Lille
Gex
Besancon
Grenoble
Aix
Rennes
ValenciennesNancy
Metz
Strasbourg
Montauban
-1
-.
5
0
.5
1
1
.5
N
at
io
n
al
 I
d
en
ti
ty
 (
2
n
d
 &
 3
rd
 E
st
at
es
)
-400000 -200000 0 200000 400000
Distance from CGF Boundary (meters)
Figure 4: The discontinuity in National Identity at the CGF border. Non-parametric estimate of eﬀect
of distance from CGF border on Identity estimated for both sides border after partialling out all control
variables. 95% confidence intervals shown by dashed lines.
5 Robustness
5.1 Specification Tests and Alternative Political Boundaries
In Table 3 below we demonstrate the robustness of our main results. In Panels A and B we test the specification
of the spatial trends using a quadratic polynomial (Panel A) and a quartic polynomial (Panel B). The results
for both Log Taxes per capita and National Identity using a quadratic polynomial are similar to using the
linear trends. All the estimates are both economically and statistically significant and are robust to restricting
the sample down to 75 kilometers from the CGF boundary. When we use quartic polynomials in distance
to the border in Panel B, the results look very similar to our baseline estimates using a cubic trend. Both
fiscal capacity and National Identity are much higher for cities inside the CGF region than outside up to
the restriction of using only observations within 150 kilometers of the border. However, when we restrict
the sample to 75 kilometers from the border, then the estimates on both Log Taxes per capita and National
Identity become indistinguishable from zero – though the effect sizes are still quite large.
In Panels C and D we investigate the robustness of our main results to the exclusion of Lyon - the second
most important city in France in the eighteenth century. The estimates using both outcome variables under
both the linear and the cubic trends are similar in size and significance to the baseline results in Table 2.
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In Panels E and F we control for whether a city was in a region using civil law as opposed to customary law as
well as controlling for whether the region was a Pays D’état or a Pay D’élection. Court cases in Early-Modern
France that did not deal with ‘high crimes’ (e.g. witchcraft, lèse majesté, patricide, etc. . . ) were adjudicated
under one of two general forms of law. In the North, customary law was used and in the south roman law
was dominant. Figure 22 in Appendix G shows the regions using these two different legal regimes. The main
differences between these two legal regimes are analogous to those between common law and civil law (See
Le Bris (2015); La Porta et al. (1998)).25 It’s thus possible that state development, economic development,
or willingness to use the court system could have been endogenous to the judicial regime in place.
The other variable controlled for in Panels E and F is whether a city was located in a Pays D’État or Pays
D’Election. The Pays D’État were more independent of the absolute monarchy. They had their own high
courts (parlements) and possessed greater control over taxation (Marion, 1999). In the Pays D’Élection,
by contrast, the monarchy had more control over the courts and fiscal matters. The distinction between
Pays D’État and Pays D’Election, furthermore, preceded the establishment of the CGF boundary – often by
hundreds of years. As such, it is important to control for this in order to distinguish the effect of the increases
in state capacity taking place within the CGF from those that already existed. Figure 21 in Appendix G
shows the map of the Pays D’États and Pays D’Elections regions. They match quite closely with the CGF
boundary except for the region south of the Gironde into Gascony and, importantly, Burgundy. This latter
difference is especially interesting since Burgundian was one of the main sources of opposition to the Bourbon
monarchy – for example many of the leaders of the civil war known as the Fronde (1648-1653) were from
there. Also Burgundy, or as it was known for centuries, the ‘Kingdom of Burgundy’ had its own distinct set
of cultural and political institutions (Davies, 2012).
As can be seen from Panels E and F in Table 3, controlling for a region’s legal origin and Pays D’État versus
Pays D’Election has little appreciable effect on our estimates. Both the size and significance of the coefficients
showing the effect of the CGF border on National Identity are similar to the baseline specifications.
Lastly, in Panel G we show simple OLS estimates without any spatial trends so as to give an idea of the
average treatment effect of CGF membership. As expected, these all exhibit the correct sign and are highly
significant. The sizes of the coefficients in specifications (1) and (4), furthermore, are comparable to those
in Table 2. This suggests our estimates of the local treatment effect of the CGF boundary on fiscal capacity
and social identity can be generalized to regions receiving the treatment, but further from the boundary.
25The data on legal regime and parlements come from Le Bris (2015).
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Full Sample <150 km <75 km Full Sample <150 km <75 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CGF Dummy 0.326** 0.522*** 0.405* 0.707*** 0.879* 1.633***
(0.158) (0.183) (0.194) (0.202) (0.430) (0.514)
R-sq 0.670 0.562 0.470 0.244 0.225 0.239
CGF Dummy 0.329* 0.331* -0.359 0.852* 1.190* 1.708
(0.183) (0.189) (0.458) (0.475) (0.646) (1.242)
R-sq 0.675 0.576 0.467 0.231 0.217 0.298
CGF Dummy 0.264** 0.312* 0.346** 0.657*** 0.641** 0.687**
(0.118) (0.153) (0.158) (0.156) (0.232) (0.282)
R-sq 0.669 0.550 0.465 0.213 0.222 0.170
CGF Dummy 0.463** 0.122 0.0603 0.619* 1.226* 0.620
(0.191) (0.133) (0.213) (0.320) (0.625) (0.907)
R-sq 0.675 0.578 0.457 0.228 0.210 0.216
CGF Dummy 0.263** 0.314* 0.399** 0.651*** 0.620** 0.640**
(0.121) (0.164) (0.182) (0.155) (0.241) (0.261)
R-sq 0.670 0.544 0.457 0.226 0.220 0.201
CGF Dummy 0.452** 0.203 0.282 0.616** 1.155** 0.212
(0.185) (0.167) (0.260) (0.275) (0.530) (0.871)
R-sq 0.676 0.572 0.441 0.228 0.202 0.271
CGF Dummy 0.426*** 0.418*** 0.392*** 0.391*** 0.556*** 0.588***
(0.0820) (0.0925) (0.114) (0.102) (0.0947) (0.149)
R-sq 0.651 0.558 0.489 0.209 0.200 0.191
Spatial Trends Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pop Density Control Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geography Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 203 122 75 179 108 66
Dependent Variable
Log Taxes Per Capita National Identity (2nd & 3rd Estates)
Panel G:  OLS
Rel., Educ., & Political 
Controls
Panel A:  Quadratic Polynomial in Distance to CGF Border
Panel B:  Quartic Polynomial in Distance to CGF Border
Panel C:  Linear Polynomial in Distance to CGF Border, Drop Lyon
Panel D:  Cubic Polynomial in Distance to CGF Border, Drop Lyon
Panel E:  Linear Polynomial in Distance to CGF Border, Control for Civil Law and Pays D'Etats
Panel F:  Cubic Polynomial in Distance to CGF Border, Control for Civil Law and Pays D'Etats
Table 3: Robustness and Specification Tests. Robust standard errors clustered on province reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance respectively.
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5.2 Analysis of Separate Boundary Segments
In Table 4 we investigate how robust our estimates are by focusing on separate segments of the CGF boundary.
Natural choices for the segments are in the West on the Brittany border, in the East, and in the South. These
choices are illustrated in Figures 5, 6, and 7.
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Figure 5: Western
CGF Boundary.
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Figure 6: Eastern
CGF Boundary.
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Figure 7: Southern
CGF Boundary.
In Table 4 we report the results of running our baseline specification on samples of cities that are restricted
to be near either the Western, Eastern, Southern CGF boundary segments. Because the sample sizes become
small very quickly when we focus on individual borders, we only report results using the full sample of cities.26
Using linear trends, the impact of the CGF boundary on the Western border is economically significant and
very large. The β coefficient on fiscal capacity in column (1) suggests that taxes per capita are between one-
half and two-thirds lower just over the Western CGF boundary. The coefficient of 0.85 estimated in column
(2) in Panel A suggests a local treatment effect of CGF membership of 1.4 times a standard deviation in the
National Identity variable (σ = 0.61). When we use the cubic trends in Panel B, the results on the Western
border remain robust. The estimate in column (2) in Panel B suggests a treatment effect of being inside the
CGF boundary on the Western border of three times a standard deviation in National Identity.
The results using the Eastern border are also highly robust. Taxes are about 50% lower just over the Eastern
boundary according to the estimates in column (3). National Identity is also much higher just inside the CGF.
The estimates with linear trends suggest a being in the CGF raises national affiliation by a little over one-half
a standard deviation. Using the cubic trends, this estimate triples and retains its statistical significance.
The Southern border yields the least robust results. Under both linear and cubic trends, there is no effect
of being inside the CGF on fiscal capacity. Specification (6) yields mixed results on National Identity. The
estimate in Panel A suggests an economically significant effect, however, under the cubic specification in Panel
B, the coefficient is basically reduced to zero. This suggests a non-robust effect in the South - a fact that is
consistent with the outlier observations in La Rochelle and around Bordeaux we observe in Figure 4.
26When using the full sample, we exclude cites outside the CGF that are not near the relevant border. So for example, when
investigating the Western border we exclude cities in the South and East that are not in the CGF.
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Dependent Variable Log Tax pc Identity Log Tax pc Identity Log Tax pc Identity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CGF Dummy 0.660*** 0.845*** 0.480*** 0.376* 0.0557 0.446**
(0.120) (0.252) (0.146) (0.207) (0.101) (0.214)
R-sq 0.671 0.264 0.675 0.346 0.660 0.148
CGF Dummy 0.484* 1.823*** 0.441** 0.905* 0.00208 0.114
(0.229) (0.426) (0.199) (0.514) (0.160) (0.371)
R-sq 0.673 0.281 0.667 0.344 0.661 0.168
Spatial Trends Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pop Density Control Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geography Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 89 80 130 112 130 125
Panel A:  Linear Polynomial in Distance to CGF Border
Panel B:  Cubic Polynomial in Distance to CGF Border
Rel., Educ., & Political 
Controls
West CGF Border East CGF Border South CGF Border
Table 4: The Eﬀect of the Cinq Grosses Fermes Border on Log Taxes per capita and National Identity :
Estimates Using Separate Border Segments. Robust standard errors clustered on province reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance respectively.
Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that support for our hypothesis that higher fiscal capacity is strongly
associated with greater affiliation with national identity is coming primarily from cities close to the Eastern
CGF boundary and the boundary between Brittany and the rest of France in the West. The results for the
Eastern boundary are particularly supportive of our hypothesis since, as mention in above, Burgundy is the
furthest East region inside the CGF, and yet it is also did not have historically strong roots to the French
monarchy.
5.3 The CGF Boundary and Linguistic Differences
Another concern raised in Section 3.1 was that our main results may be spurious because of unobserved
differences in cultural or linguistic composition between the CGF and non-CGF regions. It would be less
surprising if individuals in the CGF regions affiliated themselves more with a national as opposed to a
local identity if the very reason they joined in the first place was because they all spoke the same language.
Though, we should note that even if national identity formed around a common ethno-linguistic group (which,
to some extent, it almost certainly did), there is still the question of why this happened when it did and what
institutions initially facilitated the formation of the common national identity.
There are at least two possible interpretations of of the associations we show in Section 4. The first is
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that increases in state capacity caused increases in national identity. The second is that some unobserved
characteristic, such as genetic or linguistic heritage, caused state capacity to increase and that this then
became the institutional vehicle through which national identity was expressed. Both are interesting stories.
One way to distinguish between them is to investigate the correlation between language use and the CGF
boundary. In Early-Modern France, the major dialects in use were Langue d’oil, Langue d’oc, and Breton
(see de Certeau et al. (2002) for a discussion). Data on which regions spoke these dialects are extremely
scarce. There were a few unscientific studies during the late eighteenth century (see, e.g. de Certeau et al.
(2002)), but due to the inherent measurement problems with these, we instead use the data from Furet and
Ozouf (1977) on literacy rates around 1686 and 1786.
The Furet and Ozouf (1977) data exist because a retired school master named Louis Maggiolo was able to
persuade the French government in 1877 to undertake a systematic survey of the country’s literacy over time.
About 16,000 school teachers across all the regions of France agreed to visit local archives and scrutinize
marriage records to see what proportion of inhabitants signed their names versus making their marks. Ac-
cording to Schofield (1968), the ability to sign one’s name is equivalent to being between a reading level and
a writing level in terms of literacy. This suggests that, especially for the eighteenth century data, signing
one’s marriage certificate implies a level of education at which you would be conversant in the language of
the central government (langue d’oil). The geographic distribution of male and female literacy rates at the
end of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are shown in Figures 16, 17, 18, and 19 in Appendix F.
Table 5 shows the results of running specifications based on Equation 1 on this measure of French language
use. The main finding from the table is that there was no relationship between the use of the patois and
CGF membership in either the seventeenth or the eighteenth centuries. Overall, the results in Table 5 provide
support for the similarity of regions inside the CGF border and outside it as one approaches the border. This
also suggests that there is validity to the story that the increases in state capacity that took place within the
CGF border played a causal role in generating the national identity that is present in the Cahiers.
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Full Sample <150 km <75 km Full Sample <150 km <75 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CGF Dummy 0.0410 -0.0541 0.0128 -0.0764 -0.210 -0.0991
(0.0632) (0.0838) (0.0854) (0.0984) (0.134) (0.129)
R-sq 0.291 0.211 0.249 0.194 0.150 0.247
CGF Dummy -0.123 -0.120 0.00496 -0.294 -0.206 -0.0438
(0.117) (0.154) (0.163) (0.182) (0.260) (0.271)
R-sq 0.339 0.191 0.198 0.265 0.121 0.241
Spatial Trends Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pop Density Control Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geography Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 206 121 75 206 121 75
Dependent Variable
Male Literacy in 1686 Male Literacy in 1786
Panel A:  Linear Polynomial in Distance to CGF Border
Panel B:  Cubic Polynomial in Distance to CGF Border
Rel., Educ., & Political 
Controls
Table 5: The diﬀerence in language use inside and outside the CGF in 1686 and 1786. Robust standard
errors clustered on province reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance
respectively. Source: Furet and Ozouf (1977)
5.4 The CGF Boundary and Migration
Another possible source of bias in our estimates of the relationship between the CGF border and national
identity is migration. It’s possible that individuals who valued strong national institutions moved into the
CGF and those who did not moved out. There are no data on migration flows per se for Early-Modern
France. However, aside from the Huguenot diaspora in the aftermath of the Revocation of the Edict of
Nantes (1685) there are no known major population movements between 1661 and 1789. Furthermore, we
can look at the correlations between city sizes in 1700, 1750, and 1800 using the Bairoch et al. (1988) data
to verify this intuition.27 The Pearson correlation coefficient for log city size in 1700 and 1800 is 0.92 and
is highly statistically significant. Between 1750 and 1800 the coefficient is 0.97. These statistics suggest no
major population flows.
In addition to these simple correlations, we can also use the data from Bairoch et al. (1988) to test whether
city growth was systematically different on either side of the CGF border during the eighteenth century.
In Table 6 we present estimates of the baseline specification using city growth during the seventeenth and
27The Bairoch cities are different than the Cahiers cities. The data set contains population estimates based on primary and
secondary sources for all cities in France with populations greater than 5,000. The map of the distribution of the Bairoch cities
is presented in Appendix F, Figure 20.
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eighteenth centuries as the dependent variables. In columns (1), (2), and (3) we investigate the whether urban
growth was bigger on one side of the CGF border during the eighteenth century. None of the coefficients are
statistically significant, suggesting there was no difference in the growth of urban density on either side of the
CGF border during the eighteenth century. Of course, to interpret this as evidence of no migration requires
the assumption that migration would have been biased in one direction or the other. If there were balanced
sorting across the border, then one would expect no difference in urban growth rates.
In columns (4)-(6) we investigate whether urban growth was greater inside the CGF than outside it during
the seventeenth century. We do this to exclude the possibility that regions enjoying faster or slower economic
development may have been chosen to join the CGF in the first place. The regressions show no robustly
discernible difference in growth rates. Only the cubic polynomial regression in Panel B, column 6 is statistically
significant. However, this is based on only 22 observations and the regressions in columns (5) and (6) suggest
it is not robust.
Full Sample <150 km <75 km Full Sample <150 km <75 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CGF Dummy -0.126 -0.0992 -0.254 -0.0488 0.0302 0.0192
(0.132) (0.186) (0.227) (0.224) (0.278) (0.302)
R-sq -0.00255 0.0679 0.0807 0.225 0.369 0.523
CGF Dummy -0.0483 -0.127 -0.198 0.442 0.395 1.480*
(0.249) (0.377) (0.514) (0.391) (0.665) (0.699)
R-sq 0.00112 0.117 0.0467 0.254  0.296 0.698
Spatial Trends Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geography Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 169 87 57 61 32 22
Dependent Variable
City Growth 1700-1800 City Growth 1600-1700
Panel A:  Linear Polynomial in Distance to CGF Border
Panel B:  Cubic Polynomial in Distance to CGF Border
Table 6: Growth in urban population inside and outside the CGF during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance
respectively. City data from Bairoch (1988). Geography controls from Nunn and Qian (2011) and include
soil suitability for potatoes, soil suitability for other Old World crops, and terrain ruggedness.
6 National Identity, Cooperation, and Economic Outcomes
Our argument is that increased state capacity generated preferences in favor of uniform, national, institutions
regulating economic and political activity. Furthermore, we claim that these preferences generated higher
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economic economic development in the nineteenth century. In this section we will provide evidence for these
claims. First, we will look at the disaggregated data on the Cahiers in order to see whether individuals inside
the CGF had preferences for economic and political reforms that were more conducive to coordinating action
on the national rather than the local scale. Second, we will look at whether the nobility and the third estate
(mainly urban bourgeois in the Cahiers) were more likely to have the similar preferences inside the CGF
than outside or it. Third, we will look at measures of economic development in the nineteenth century. The
primary measure we will focus on is direct tax receipts collected between 1817 and 1821. This is a good
measure of the income of regional populations since, after the Revolution, the French government collected
these in a uniform way (same rates etc. . . ) across the entire country. Additionally, we will look at measures
of use of the formal contracting activity, as proxied by notarial transaction. We will also look at fertility rates
in 1821 inside and outside the CGF in order to evaluate the extent to which each region was transitioning
from a Malthusian to a modern economic growth regime Galor (2011). Lastly, we will look at amount of
local public goods spending inside and outside the CGF between 1878 and 1902 – the earliest these data
are available. This will provide us with additional evidence that regions inside the CGF had norms which
inclined them more towards cooperation than those regions outside.
6.1 Preferences for National Institutions Inside the CGF
In this section we look at the disaggregated data from the Cahiers in order to test whether regions inside
the CGF were more likely to have preferences for formal institutions that encouraged a uniform treatment of
individuals on political and economic margins. We will look at separate correlations for different institutions
for each of the first, second, and third estates. The way the Cahiers are coded is that when an institution is
mentioned, then this gives that city/estate a one. If the institution is never mentioned, then the Cahier is
coded as a zero on that topic. The National Identity variable that we’ve been using so far is an average over
many topics that were coded up. Once the disaggregated data are used, unfortunately, sample sizes generally
become very small. For this reason, we will restrict our attention to investigating simple correlations in this
sub-section.
Columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 7 investigates stated preferences for a national education system, uniform
administrative and legal codes, and uniform economic regulations respectively. All of these institutions match
closely with what we have been calling ‘national institutions’ so far in the paper. All three estates expressed
strong support for them. For example, the statistic in column (3) of Panel A suggests that there was 20%
more support for regulations supporting greater economic uniformity inside the CGF than outside. The p-
value for the t-test of difference in means is given in brackets and the number of positive (‘yes’) observations
across the whole noble cahiers sample is reported as 30. The only national institution which does not have
statistically significant greater support inside the CGF is national education, however, that statistic is still
positive (6%).
Columns (4) - (5) report on institutions that explicitly undermined the feudal regime. Column (4) addresses
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whether or not the Cahier expressed support for giving the third estate enough power to outvote the first and
second estates in the upcoming Constituent Assembly. This was a major issue since in all previous Estates
General, the traditional forces of the feudal regime – the nobility and clergy – were always able to outvote the
third estate despite its larger numbers since votes were tallied by estate rather than by head. The statistics
in column (4) are all positive, but relatively small. Notably, the nobility were 6% more likely to support vote
by head inside the CGF than outside. Column (5) reports the number of Cahiers indicating that they wanted
legal uniformity in the sense that all estates would be treated equally under the law. There is significantly
more support for this inside the CGF than outside.
In columns (7) and (8) we look at which Cahiers asked for feudal dues or serfdom to be abolished. Across
the board there is more support for these institutional changes inside the CGF.
Overall, the numbers in Table 7 support the argument that regions inside the CGF held preferences for
institutions that would coordinate political and economic activity at the national, as opposed to at the local,
level.
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Support for 
National 
Education
Uniformity of  
Admin and 
Legal System
Greater 
Economic 
Uniformity
Approve Vote 
by Head in 
Estates 
General
Same Law for 
All Estates
Suppress vs 
Maintain 
Guilds
Abolish 
Feudal Dues
Abolish 
Serfdom
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean Diff  (CGF - Not CGF) 0.123** 0.101* 0.201*** 0.060* 0.108*** 0.191 0.067** 0.034*
[0.015] [0.055] [0.000] [0.083] [0.001] [0.355] [0.042] [0.092]
number "yes" obs = 31 37 30 14 11 Suppress=13 11 5
Maintain=3
Mean Diff  (CGF - Not CGF) 0.057 0.111* 0.300*** 0.007 0.236*** 0.142 0.095 0.095**
[0.294] [0.057] [0.000] [0.464] [0.000] [0.194] [0.162] [0.051]
number "yes" obs = 35 54 111 1 68 Suppress=53 147 31
Maintain=40
Mean Diff  (CGF - Not CGF) 0.189*** 0.100** 0.094** 0.045 0.079** 0.200 0.094* 0.082***
[0.001] [0.008] [0.008] [0.399] [0.036] [0.297] [0.065] [0.001]
number "yes" obs = 41 17 16 32 15 Suppress=10 33 7
Maintain=1
Topic Mentioned in Cahiers
Panel A:  Cahiers of  Nobility
Panel B:  Cahiers of  Third Estate
Panel C:  Cahiers of  Clergy
Table 7: The eﬀect of CGF membership on preferences for standardization and reform. T-tests of diﬀerence in mean number of
positive responses reported between the CGF cahiers and the non-CGF cahiers. P-values in brackets. Number “yes” Obs = gives
the number of districts advocating the reform topic in the General Cahiers. For every test, there are 208 total General Cahiers for
each of the Nobility, Third Estate, and the Clergy. There are 135 cahiers outside the CGF and 73 inside. *, **, and *** represent
1%, 5%, and 10% significance respectively.
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6.2 Agreement Between Second and Third Estates
An important part of the argument of this paper is that higher state capacity makes it more likely that
individuals cooperate because they come to share a common sense of identity. In Table 8 we test this by
looking at whether being located within the CGF made the second and third estates more likely to hold the
same value for National Identity. Specifically, we construct a variable called SD Identity which measures the
standard deviation of the identities of the two estates in each city. We then run our baseline specifications in
Table 8 using this as the dependent variable.
Full Sample <150 km <75 km Full Sample <150 km <75 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CGF Dummy -0.315* -0.514* -0.774** -0.560* -0.868* -0.908
(0.164) (0.257) (0.272) (0.306) (0.448) (0.864)
R-sq 0.107 0.121 0.260 0.131 0.147 0.201
Spatial Trends Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pop Density Control Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geography Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 108 66 43 108 66 43
Dependent Variable = Standard Deviation of  2nd and 3rd Estate Identity
Linear Polynomial in Distance to CGF Border Cubic Polynomial in Distance to CGF Border
Rel., Educ., & Political 
Controls
Table 8: The eﬀect of CGF membership on variance of National Identity between second and third
estates. Robust standard errors clustered on province reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent
1%, 5%, and 10% significance respectively.
The coefficient estimates in Table 8 strongly support the hypothesis that the second and third estates were
more likely to hold common social preferences inside the CGF than outside. Given that a standard deviation
in SD Identity is 0.37, the linear specifications reported in columns (1) - (3) suggest being inside the CGF
increases agreement between the two estates by between one and two standard deviations. Under the cubic
specification, these estimates increase to about a two to two and half standard deviation decrease in the
outcome variable. Overall, these results suggests that not only did national affiliation increase inside the
CGF during the eighteenth century, but that this process also generated a shared sense of identity between
the nobility and urban merchants inside the CGF region.
6.3 National Identity and Economic Outcomes in the Nineteenth Century
We now look at the level of economic development inside the CGF compared to outside during the nineteenth
century. Since the data we have on nineteenth century outcomes are at the Department rather than the city
level, we abandon the regression discontinuity approach used in previous sections and instead run simple OLS
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regressions, with a large number of control variables, to identity our effects. The main specification we will
run is:
yij = α + β cgfXidentityi + θ Urbani +G
0
j · Γ+P
0
j ·∆+ εij (2)
where yij is equal to one of our six department-level measures of nineteenth century outcomes for city i
in department j. The six measures are Tax1817-21, Doors&Wind1822, Contracts1817-21, Fertility1821,
LPGVillage, and LPGState. Tax1817-21 measures the average amount paid between 1817 and 1821 to the
four direct wealth taxes known as the contribution foncière, contribution personnelle mobilière, patente and
the portes et fenêtres.28 These taxes, which eventually became known as the quatre vielles, were collected in
the same way (e.g. same rates and bases) across all the territories of France for decades. As such, they can be
used as a gauge of economic development in the same way that, for example, Becker and Woessmann (2009)
use tax receipts for nineteenth century Prussia. Doors&Wind1822 comes from the census of 1822 and measures
the number of visible doors and windows from the outside of all residential buildings adjusted for population
of the department. As such, this variable is a rough measure of the wealth of a region. Contracts1817-21 is
the average amount of tax paid on notary contracts in the department between 1817 and 1821. This tax,
known as the Droit d’enregistrement was assessed at a uniform rate (by type of transaction) on the value
of all notary contracts. These sorts of contracts were used for mortgages, sales of high value items, or any
transaction involving a real asset.29 As such, this measure is particularly useful for us since it proxies for the
degree to which individuals are using national-level formal sector institutions to intermediate transactions.
Fertility1821 measures completed fertility in 1821 and comes from Bonneuil (2007). This year is chosen as it
is the earliest observation we can get that is unaffected by the upheavals of the Revolutionary or Napoleonic
periods. Furthermore, we focus on early fertility since we want to identify the origins of the transition from
the Malthusian to the Modern growth regimes and, over the subsequent decades, all Departments in France
are converging to relatively low fertility rates.
We also investigate two dependent variables that measure spending on public goods. The first concerns
spending by Communes, which are the equivalent of county, or district, level spending in the United States.30
These were the lowest level administrative divisions in nineteenth century France for which data a generally
available. LPGVillage measures the per capita Departmental average of spending on education by all of
its communes between 1855 and 1902. These data are based on the series collected by Diebolt and Trabelsi
28These data were collected by David LeBris from the Annuaires Statistiques and used in Le Bris (2015). As described in
Le Bris (2015): ‘The contribution foncière is a tax on the value of real estate (land and building) paid by the owner. The
contribution personnelle mobilière is a tax on the value of houses, but paid by the occupant and not the owner. The patente is
a tax on business (trade and industry) mainly based on the value of the building occupied. The portes et fenêtres is a tax on
the number of doors and windows visible from the street, again paid by the occupant and not the owner.’
29See Le Bris (2015) for more discussion.
30The three main administrative divisions in nineteenth century France, from the lowest level of hierarchy to the highest,
were the Commune, the Department, and the State.
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(2009) and extended by Franck and Johnson (2014).31. LPGState represents education spending by state level
governments in the Department. We do not expect this last variable to be related to norms of cooperation
since national spending on public goods relied less on Department level norms of cooperation than on uniform
allocation rules set at the national level.
On the right hand side of Equation 2 we have cgfXidentityi, which is a dummy variable equal to one times
the value of National Identity for city i if that city is inside the CGF boundary. If city i is outside the
CGF boundary, then cgfXidentityi is equal to zero. In effect, this variable is a weighted measure of the
state-capacity treatment for city i. It is also our variable of interest.
As controls we include Urbani which is equal to the late eighteenth century urban density of city i and is
identical the variable used in the baseline regressions above.32 Gj is a vector of department and city-level
geographic controls including: wheat suitability, linear distance of the city from the sea or nearest major river,
ruggedness of the terrain surrounding the city, and the average altitude of the department in which the city
is located.33 Pj is a vector of city or department-level political and cultural controls including: bishoprics,
archbishoprics, university, and commune, which are identical to the controls used in Section 2. Additionally,
P contains a measure of the protestant population of the department in which the city is located in 1866 as
well as two dummy variables indicating whether the department used to be part of a Pays D’État or Pays
D’Élection and whether the department used roman or customary law during the ancien régime.34 εij is an
error term. To take into account the fact that all the dependent variables are measured at the Department
level even though we are also using city-level data when we estimate Equation 2 we will alway cluster errors
at the Department level.
Table 9 reports the results of estimating Equation 2 on Tax1817-21, Doors&Wind1822, Contracts1817-21,
Fertility1821, LPGVillage, and LPGState. Columns (1) and (2) show the estimates using Tax1817-21 as the
dependent variable. In column (1), when no controls are included, the association between cgf membership
weighted by national identity is both economically and statistically very strong. The coefficient of 2.06 is
interpreted as a one standard deviation increase in cgfXidentity is associated with 0.62 of standard deviation
increase in Tax1817-21. When all the controls are included, the coefficient size is cut in half but remains
economically and statistically convincing. Regression (2) in Table 9 is our strongest evidence for an effect
of nationality identity on subsequent economic development in France. Non-parametric estimates of all the
regressions that include controls in Table 9 are shown in Figure 11 in Appendix E. As can be seen from the
non-parametric figure the relationship between Tax1817-21 and cgfXidentity increases monotonically which
is exactly what we would predict.
31We use population from the Annuaire Statistique in 1886 to convert these numbers to per capita terms.
32We have also run regressions using later measures of urban density and the results are unchanged. These regressions are
available on request.
33With the exception of the altitude measure, which is from Le Bris (2015), these controls are identical to those used in the
baseline regressions.
34These last three, department level, control are from Le Bris (2015).
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In columns (3) and (4) we report the results of estimating Equation 2 on Doors&Wind1822. The results
here are again robust. When all controls are included the coefficient is 0.046 which is interpreted as a
one standard deviation in cgfXidentity is associated with about a fifth of a standard deviation increase
in Industry1860. This offers additional support for the hypothesis that the support for strong national
institutions that was associated with increases in fiscal capacity during the ancien regime, also were associated
with greater economic development.
In columns (5) and (6) we look at the Contracts1822 which measures the value of transactions intermediated
by notaries. The results here, again, robustly show that higher association with national identity was also
associated with greater use of formal financial instruments. Furthermore, the conditional non-parametric
relationship shown between cgfXidentity and Contracts1822 in panel (c) of Figure E suggests a gradual
increase in the use of notaries as reported identity from the cahiers increases.
Columns (5) and (6) investigate the relationship between fertility rates in 1821 and cgfXidentity. We look
at this variable for two reasons. First, the demographic transition plays a central role in unified growth
models which attempt to explain the transition from the Malthusian economy to modern economic growth
(see, e.g. Galor and Weil (2000)). Furthermore, the French demographic transition is particularly interesting
since it seems to have been both very early and very influential across Europe (Spolaore and Wacziarg,
2014). This set of regressions can offer insight into whether or not the influence of the French state on social
identity may have been correlated with the shift in fertility behavior that was associated with the French
demographic transition. The results in columns (5) and (6) are suggestive, but somewhat weaker than for the
purely economic outcomes. Both coefficients are negative and, with no controls, the coefficient in (5) is also
precisely estimated. This suggests that there is some association between affiliation with national identity and
fertility restrictions. When all controls are included, however, the coefficient on cgfXidentity is statistically
insignificant and the size of the coefficient is cut in half. This is perhaps consistent with the work of Spolaore
and Wacziarg (2014) which suggests that the underlying processes driving economic innovation were different
than those driving fertility adjustment.
We next investigate the effect of National Identity on local public goods provisionment. It is well known in
the economics and political science literatures that in developing economies, fractionalization is negatively
related to a localities overcoming the costs of collectively providing LPG’s such as education, welfare, and other
infrastructure (Alesina et al., 1999; Miguel, 2004). We predict that local public goods provisionment, measured
as LPGVillage should be positively correlated with cgfXidentity. This is because those who affiliate more
strongly with national identity will be more willing and able to overcome the coordination problems necessary
to contribute to public goods than those who have a more local outlook (see, e.g., Alesina et al. (1999) or
Miguel (2004)). By similar logic, we predict that spending by the national government in a Department should
be uncorrelated with National Identity since national spending was less contingent on local preferences for
public goods (and thereby should have been unaffected by heterogeneity etc. . . ).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
cgfXidentity 2.063*** 1.140*** 0.108*** 0.0462** 0.506*** 0.252** -0.0225** -0.0138 0.126*** 0.0705** -0.0122 -0.00328
(0.351) (0.242) (0.0303) (0.0220) (0.121) (0.112) (0.00946) (0.0108) (0.0297) (0.0274) (0.0261) (0.0276)
[0.62] [0.35] [0.46] [0.20] [0.46] [0.23] [0.25] [0.15] [0.43] [0.24] [0.06] [0.02]
R-sq 0.391 0.588 0.200 0.499 0.205 0.484 0.0616 0.227 0.190 0.511 -0.00279 0.467
Pop Density Control N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Geography Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Observations 176 176 176 176 176 176 166 166 168 167 168 167
Fertility1821 LPG Village 1855-1902 LPG State 1855-1902
Dependent Variable
Tax1817-21 Doors&Wind 1817-21 Contracts 1817-21
Rel., Educ., & Political 
Controls
Table 9: National identity and nineteenth century economic development. Standard errors clustered on department reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance respectively. Numbers in brackets represent the proportion of a
standard deviation of the dependent variable a one standard deviation increase in cgfXidentity induces. Source: See text.
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Columns (9) and (10) of Table 9 show the association between national identification inside the CGF and
education spending at the village level around the middle of the nineteenth century (earlier data on local
public goods are, unfortunately, not available). Overall, these results support our hypothesis that National
Identity should be correlated with the ability of a region to invest in local public goods such as state provided
education. With all the controls included, the coefficient on cgfXidentity suggests a one standard deviation
increase in identity is associated with a quarter of a standard deviation increase in local public goods spending.
This result provides support for the crowding-in hypothesis concerning the relationship between strong state
institutions and informal norms of cooperative behavior (Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012; Tabellini, 2010;
Becker et al., 2014). We should note, however, that we are unable to identify whether the mechanism through
which local public goods spending is higher is through formal (e.g. better bureaucracy) or informal (e.g.
trust behavior) institutions. Encouragingly, when we investigate the relationship between cgfXidentity and
spending by the state on local public goods (LPGState) we find no relationship. This suggests that the results
for Village level spending are not being generated by some unobserved factor such as rent seeking from the
central government.
Overall, the results of our regressions looking at outcomes for the nineteenth century provide robust support
for the correlation between preferences for national institutions and economic development. Furthermore,
given that we restrict our attention to national identity within the CGF region, and combined with our
other results, there appears to be a strong association between state capacity, national identity, and economic
development.
7 Conclusions
In The Old Regime and the French Revolution, Alexis de Tocqueville describes how, in creating a strong
fiscal and legal state, the Absolute Monarchy sowed the seeds of its own destruction and paved the way
towards modernity. The research described in this paper provides vital empirical support for this claim
by showing that, even within France, variation in the strength of the institutions of the Monarchy had a
profound effect on the social identity of its subjects and their subsequent support for national economic
and political institutions. Furthermore, these institutions appear to explain a great deal of variation in the
regional distribution of economic development during the early nineteenth century.
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Appendices for Online Publication Only
A Correlated Equilibrium and the State as Choreographer
The purpose of this section is to summarize the model of coordinating behavior described in Gintis (2014)
and to relate it to an explanation of how state capacity can increase coordination between individuals.
Consider the following simple n-player game described by Gintis (2014): Each player chooses an integer k
from 1 to 10. Nature also chooses an integer k. Each player wins 1 if they all choose the same integer.
They receive 0 if not. Each player can also query nature for a noisy signal equal to the true value of k with
probability p > 0.10. The simple best response in this game is for each player is to query nature and play
the value of the signal. The expected payoff is then pn.
There also exists a correlated equilibrium of this game in which the players recognize a social rule which
requires the youngest player to reveal her choice (based on the signal she receives from nature). This is a
correlated equilibrium because, assuming players n−i follow the rule, it is a best response for player i to follow
it as well. Payoffs are now p. The social rule (to follow the youngest player) in this example can be interpreted
as the choreographer of a correlated equilibrium.
According to Gintis (2014, 32), ‘A correlated equilibrium of an epistemic game G is a Nash equilibrium of
a game G+, in which G is augmented by an initial move by a new player, whom we call the choreographer,
who observes a random variable γ on a probability space (Γ, p), and issues a ‘directive’ fi(γ) ∈ Si to each
player i as to which pure strategy to choose. Following the choreographer’s directive is a best response for
each player [assuming all other players follow choreographer].’ This definition may seem unrealistic since
the choreographer implies some external agency, however, there is a well known theorem of Aumann (1987)
that shows Bayesian rational agents in an epistemic game G with common subjective priors play a correlated
equilibrium of G. So there need not be an external agent. In terms of our simple game, so long as the players
know the probability distribution of the types of the other players and their payoffs (and this is common
knowledge) and if they are rational, then they will play as if there is an explicit choreographer. To take a
relevant example from the paper, priors might consist of beliefs about the probability that each player assigns
to which system of weights and measures to adopt.
How does being subject to the same set of fiscal and legal institutions generate common priors? There is
no agreement on the philosophical grounding of probabilistic statements (von Mises, 1981; de Laplace, 1996;
Gillies, 2000; Keynes, 2004). However, if we assume symmetric reasoners subject to mutually accessible
events, then common knowledge can be generated (Gintis, 2014, 140).
Let an indicator be an event N that specifies a social event E to all individuals in a group. E.g., the indicator
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(N) that we are all having the monarchy’s unit of account, the Livre Tournois, imposed on us specifies the
social event (E) that the Livre Tournois is the appropriate unit of account to use in exchange. We can then
define Symmetric Reasoning as follows: Individual i is a symmetric reasoner with respect to j for an indicator
N of event E if, whenever i knows N , and i knows that j knows N , then i knows that j knows E (See (Gintis,
2014, 141) and (Vanderschraaf and Sillari, 2007)). Additionally, If an indicator (N) is mutually accessible to
a given population, then Gintis (2014) proves that Bayesian rational symmetric reasoners will adopt E as
common knowledge.
We follow Gintis (2014) in interpreting the development of symmetric reasoning as stemming primarily
from sociobiological processes such as gene-culture coevolution (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1973; Boyd
and Richerson, 1985). However, we interpret the role of increases in state capacity as increasing the mutual
accessibility of indicators (N). This has two components:
1. Increasing the number of mutually accessible indicators.
2. Increasing the size of the population subject to the mutually accessible indicators.
Within the area of the CGF more mutually accessible indicators were present since the monarchy was imposing
common fiscal and legal institutions there at the same time as it was suppressing local, feudal, institutions.
Furthermore, the size of the population subject to these accessible indicators was dramatically increased by
the creation of the CGF. We conclude, that individuals in the CGF were more likely to reach a cooperative
equilibrium in which national level institutions were taken as the choreographer guiding them how to behave.
Individuals outside the CGF, where state capacity was both weaker, and the populations generally smaller,
did not benefit to the same extent from these choreographing institutions.
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B Inclusion Criteria for Cities in the CGF
Figure 8: The Provinces Contained within the Cinq Gross Fermes. Extract from the ‘Cinq Grosses
Fermes’ entry in le Rond d’Alembert and Diderot (1784).
Figure 9: Explanation of Special Lyonnais Relationship with Cinq Gross Fermes. Extract from the ‘Cinq
Grosses Fermes’ entry in le Rond d’Alembert and Diderot (1784).
37
Taxes, National Identity, and Nation Building Johnson
C Increases in French Fiscal Capacity during the Seventeenth Century
The sixteenth and seventeenth century French fiscal system was a patchwork of different taxes and loans.
Receipts were categorized in two ways: extraordinary and ordinary revenues.35 Extraordinary revenues were
particularly important during times of economic distress (usually wartime) and came from temporary surtaxes
(e.g. the taillon) or loans, sometimes forced, from the wealthy (e.g. the dons gratuits paid by the clergy).
Ordinary revenues, by contrast, derived from taxes that were relatively well established and recurring. After
the establishment of the Company of General Farms in 1664 all ordinary taxes were collected under the direct
control of the state – that is the ‘capacity’ of the state to tax was well represented by the size of these tax
revenues.36 They included the local city taxes known as octrois (Franck et al., 2014) and indirect taxes of all
sorts (e.g. taxes collected through the tax farms).
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Figure 10: Total tax revenues and tailles revenues, 1600–1695. Vertical dashed lines indicate the dates
France entered the Thirty Years War (1635) and the beginning of Louis XIV’s personal rule (1661)
The increase in the fiscal capacity of the centralized French state during the seventeenth century is shown
below in Figure 10.37 The dashed line shows the per capita silver value of all revenues collected. These include
both ordinary tax revenues in addition to loans and temporary financial expedients. The solid line shows
the revenues coming directly from the primary direct tax collected by the crown known as the taille. As is
clear from Figure 10, while revenues were increasing throughout the century, there is a marked jump in the
35See Guéry (1978) for an overview of ancien regime financial records.
36For a detailed discussion of the establishment of fiscal capacity in France around this time, see Johnson and Koyama (2014a)
37Data are from Richard and Bonney (2011) and are converted to silver equivalents Wailly (1857). Population data from 1700
are from Dupâquier (1988). ‘Total Revenues’ are equal to the sum of extraordinary revenues and ordinary revenues. ‘Tailles
Revenues’ are a subset of ordinary revenues, the other major component coming from the tax farms Johnson (2006).
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regime’s capacity to collect taxes through the tailles starting around 1635 when France entered the Thirty
Years War (1618-1648). Moreover, whereas increases in revenues between 1600 and 1635 tended to come from
so-called ‘extraordinary’ sources, such as loans (voluntary and forced) and temporary taxes, after 1635 there
was a dramatic rise in revenues coming from ‘ordinary’ sources that were managed directly by the crown.
The move away from extraordinary taxes along with the massive increase in tax revenues collected through
ordinary sources represents the increase in fiscal capacity we discuss in the paper.
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D Descriptive Statistics for Nineteenth Century Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
cgfXidentity 176 0.95 1.23 0.00 3.00
Direct Tax 1817-21 176 11.97 4.06 5.51 22.13
Doors & Wind 1817-21 176 1.15 0.29 0.60 1.94
Contracts 1817-21 176 4.66 1.36 1.85 8.28
Fertility 1822 166 0.38 0.11 0.25 0.82
LPGVillage 1855-1902 167 -0.02 0.36 -0.96 0.50
LPGState 1855-1902 167 0.74 0.27 -0.02 1.58
Wheat Suitability 176 3.61 1.22 1.00 7.00
Dseas 176 177244.40 115271.90 0.00 417348.30
Drivers 176 64832.67 72663.16 49.09 360389.10
Ruggedness 176 0.70 0.18 0.12 0.97
Altitude 176 292.41 295.64 34.00 1671.00
Bishoprics 176 0.39 0.30 0.00 1.00
Archbishoprics 176 0.11 0.18 0.00 1.00
Universities 176 0.11 0.15 0.00 1.00
Communes 176 0.55 0.37 0.00 1.00
Protestant 176 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.31
Civil Law 176 0.55 0.87 0.00 3.00
Pays D'Etat 176 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00
Urban 176 26.91 17.79 7.64 103.50
Variable of  Interest and 19th c Outcomes
Control Variables
Table 10: Descriptive statistics for nineteenth century regressions in Section 6.3. Source: See text.
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E Non-parametric Figures for 19th Century Outcome Regressions
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Figure 11: Non-parametric relationship between nineteenth century outcomes and cgfXidentity. All
figures condition on control variables used in regressions in Section 6.3. Dashed lines show 95% confidence
intervals.
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F Supporting Figures
Legend
Average Urban Density
Value
High : 305.882
Low : 0.261207
Figure 12: Urban Density. Constructed by assigning a value for urban density to each grid cell using the
inverse weighted average (power of 1.5) of the surrounding Bosker et al. (2013) cities with populations of
at least 5,000 in 1800.
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Figure 13: Major Rivers and Seas and the Cahiers Cities. Source: Euratlas (2012).
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Figure 14: Wheat Suitability and Cahiers Cities. Source: Fischer et al. (2002).
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Figure 15: Terrain Ruggedness and Cahiers Cities. Source: Sappington et al. (2007).
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Figure 16: Male literacy rates in 1686. Source: Furet and Ozouf (1977).
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Figure 17: Male literacy rates in 1786. Source: Furet and Ozouf (1977).
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Figure 18: Female literacy rates in 1686. Source: Furet and Ozouf (1977).
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Figure 19: Female literacy rates in 1786. Source: Furet and Ozouf (1977).
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Figure 20: Bairoch Cities and the CGF boundary. Source: Bairoch (1988).
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G Other Jurisdictional Borders
Figure 21: Map showing the Pays d’État and the Pays d”Election around 1789. Source: Shepherd
(1956).
Figure 22: Map showing Law Courts and Legal Regions around 1789. Source: Shepherd (1956).
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